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DEATH PRONE JURORS: THE DISINTEGRATION OF
THE WITHERSPOON RULE IN TEXAS
MARY ELIZABETH CARMODY

The fluctuating views of the American people toward capital punishment, together with the accused's right to be tried by an impartial jury,
have created a unique dilemma for the judiciary when selecting juries to
sit in capital cases. In 1968, although the death penalty was still being
assessed by juries on defendants convicted of capital offenses, the attitude
of the American public revealed some disenchantment with its imposition.,
At that time state statutes allowed the prosecution to challenge for cause
any prospective juror who held "conscientious scruples" against the infliction of the death penalty.' Jury panels selected in this manner appeared
to be "death-qualified." The United States Supreme Court attempted to
curtail this practice in Witherspoon v. Illinois. The court ruled that a
prospective juror in a capital case could not be excused unless he made
"unmistakably clear" that he would not, under any circumstances, vote
for the imposition of capital punishment, or that the juror's attitude would
not allow him to make an "impartial decision as the defendant's guilt."4
This issue became temporarily moot in 1972, however, when the Court
declared capital punishment unconstitutional because of the discretion
state statutes allowed juries in determining whether or not guilty defen1. The United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)
noted a 1966 survey which showed 42% of the American public in favor of capital punishment
for persons convicted of murder, 47% opposed, and 11% undecided. The study had been
conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion and designed to be representative of
the views of American adults (21 and older). Approximately 1,523 people were interviewed.
Id. at 520 n.16; M. HINDE LANG, C. DUNN, L. SuTroN & A. AUMICK, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1973 at 50 (1973). A similar study in 1972, conducted by the same organization interviewing 3,347 Americans, 18 and older, found 50% in favor, 41% opposed and 9%
undecided. Id. at 153. A 1970 survey by Louis Harris & Associates questioned American men
and women (21 and older) with regard to their feelings about capital punishment in the
abstract. The study showed that of women nationwide, 39% favored capital punishment, 46%
opposed and 15% not sure. The study further indicated that 55% of the American men
interviewed believed in capital punishment, 37% opposed and 8% not sure. Id. at 152.
2. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 743 (1959) (repealed 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 660 (1969); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(b)(1) (1966).
3. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). "Whatever else might be said of capital punishment, it is at least
clear that its imposition by a hanging jury cannot be squared with the Constitution." Id. at
523.
4. Id. at 522-23 n.21. This decision applied retroactively. Id. at 523 n.22. The sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartialjury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.

...
U.S. CONST. amend. VI

(emphasis added).
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dants should be put to death.' In July, 1976, the Court resurrected the
death penalty and the concomitant jury selection problem when it held
that the statutory schemes for its imposition, as enacted by three states,
complied with the mandates of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.6
The qualification of jurors in death penalty cases has been controversial
in Texas both prior and subsequent to the enactment of the state's new
death penalty statutes.' In the nine years following Witherspoon, the Texas
courts have been, for the most part, erratic in implementing its tenets.'
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently held that Witherspoon considerations are unnecessary when a juror is disqualified under section
12.31(b) of the new Penal Code.' That section requires a mandatory oath
stating that a juror in a capital case will not allow the penalty imposed to
"affect his deliberation on any issue of fact."'"
Although the Texas Legislature restructured the statute in an attempt
to comply with the mandate of Witherspoon, the present interpretation by
the Texas judiciary excludes Witherspoon's application altogether." An
5. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr.
Justice Marshall agreed that one of the reasons at that time for the invalidity of the death
penalty was that it was morally unacceptable to many Americans. See id. at 295, 360; Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (eighth amendment must be applied in way that reflects
evolving moral standards of the country).
6. Gregg v. Georgia,

(1976); Jurek v. Texas,
Proffitt v. Florida,

__

-

U.S ..-.

-

US....
U.S.

-,

96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 893

96 S. Ct. 2950, 2958, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, 941 (1976);
-

96 S. Ct. 2960, 2970, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913, 927 (1976).

Two other states, however, had their death penalties declared unconstitutional at the same
time. Roberts v. Louisiana, U.S.
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, -

, -,

U.S.

96 S. Ct. 3001, 3008, 49 L. Ed. 2d 974, 983
-,...
96 S. Ct. 2978, 2992, 49 L. Ed. 2d

944, 961-62 (1976). The eighth amendment to the Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusualpunishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). This amendment is made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
. 7. See, e.g., Brock v. State, No. 53,108, slip op. at 3-6 (Tex. Crim. App. June 14, 1977);
Burns v. State, No. 50,576, slip op. at 4-14 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 1977); Hovila v. State,
532 S.W.2d 293, 294-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 380-84 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972); Grider v. State, 468 S.W.2d 393, 398-400 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Ellison
v. State, 432 S.W.2d 955, 956-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). See also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§
12.31, 19.03 (1974); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Supp. 1976-77).
Editor's Note: The following cases, cited throughout this comment have not been published, pending the issuance of a mandate by the Court of Criminal Appeals: Brock v. State,
Burns v. State, Shippy v. State, Whitmore v. State. These decisions, therefore, may be
altered or withdrawn prior to publication.
8. See cases cited note 7 supra.
9. Burns v. State, No. 50,576, slip op. at 6-7 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 1977); Shippy v.
State, No. 53,831, slip op. at 5 (Tex. Crim. App. April 27, 1977); Whitmore v. State, No.
52,325, slip op. at 5-6 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1976); Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664, 672
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
10. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (1974).
11. See cases cited note 9 supra.
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examination of how and why this paradoxical interpretation developed in
Texas exposes the need for both greater guidance in this area from the
Supreme Court and compliance in application of the rule by the Texas
courts.
THE

Witherspoon LINEAGE

The narrow issue presented in Witherspoon v. Illinois"s arises in most, if
not all, capital cases. The question involved was whether the state might
challenge for cause a prospective juror who stated during voir dire examination that he or she held conscientious scruples against the infliction of
the death penalty. 3 The defendant contended that the exclusion of
"scrupled" jurors resulted in jury eligibility only for those veniremen who
favored, or were neutral toward, the infliction of the death penalty." The
result, according to the defendant, was a conviction-prone jury that was
biased in favor of the ultimate penalty."5
Although the Court did not believe the data adduced by the defendant
was applicable to the determination of guilt, the majority found the jury
selection procedure did not ensure a panel that was impartial regarding the
punishment imposed." Noting that the national attitude toward capital
punishment was shifting against the death penalty, 7 the Court found that
a jury selected by the procedure in Witherspoon could represent the view
of a minority of the community." Therefore, in order to avoid producing a
jury "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die,"'" the Court enunciated a two-prong test to preserve the impartiality of a jury in a capital case.
The Court held that only those veniremen may be excluded who make
"unmistakably clear"
(1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital
punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the
12. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
13. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 513-14 (1968). Forty-seven veniremen had been
excused for cause under an Illinois statute which allowed the prosecution to challenge any
juror who expressed a general objection to the death penalty. Id. at 514.
14. Id. at 516-17.
15. Id. at 516-17.
16. Id. at 519. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, expressed the Court's view:
[Gluided by neither rule nor standard "free to select or reject as it [sees] fit," a jury
that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little
more-and must do nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on
the ultimate question of life or death.
Id. at 519.
17. Id. at 520 n.16. See note 1 supra.
18. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968). "It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community." Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). See generally 53 MINN.
L. REV. 838, 843 (1969).
19. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968).
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trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death
penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the
defendant's guilt.20
The majority also held that the dictates of justice demanded a fully retroactive application of this test, 2' which would affect only the death sentence
and would not disturb the conviction of a defendant.2"
The Witherspoon holding came at the height of social criticism of the
death penalty in the United States. 23 While the Court was not prepared to
hold the death penalty unconstitutional at that time, 24 it did demand that
veniremen in capital cases be willing to consider all potential punishments.25 A juror would justifiably be excluded should he be "irrevocably
committed" to vote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence
produced at the trial.26 A death penalty could not stand if a juror were
excluded on any "broader basis."
In his dissent Mr. Justice Black identified a problem with the majority
opinion in Witherspoon when he noted its ambiguity. In his view the only
change required by the majority was that the states must now specifically
inquire whether a prospective juror would automatically vote against the
infliction of the death penalty. He saw no significant difference in the
composition of a jury after the application of the Witherspoon test. In
effect, he perceived the majority holding to be a warning to the states to
amend their jury selection procedures or risk reversal of their capital convictions as unconstitutional."
Although the two-pronged test appeared clear on its face, its practical
implementation proved to be more difficult. The Court attempted to clarify the Witherspoon doctrine in Boulden v. Holman,3" and reaffirmed the
20. Id. at 522 n.21.
21. Id. at 523 n.22. Twenty-seven states filed amicus curiae briefs asking for prospective
application of any new constitutional decision on this point. The Court ruled against the
request, because in its view the jury selection procedure involved undermined "the very
integrity of the ... process." Id. at 523 n.22.
22. Id. at 523 n.21. See also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545 (1968) (Court
declined consideration of jury selection issue, where petitioner charged with capital offense
received life sentence).
23. See note 1 supra. See generally H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY INAMERICA, at 231257 (1964).
24. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 540 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 522 n.21.
26. Id. at 522 n.21.
27. Id. at 522 n.21. See generally Oberer, Does Disqualificationof Jurors for Scruples
Against CapitalPunishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEXAS L.
REv. 545, 547-49 (1961); Comment, Jury Challenges, CapitalPunishment and Labat v. Bennett: A Reconciliation, 1968 DUKE L.J. 283, 299-309.
28. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 538 (Black, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 539 (Black, J., dissenting).
30. 394 U.S. 478 (1969).
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need for a clear and unmistakable statement by the prospective juror.3 For
the exclusion to be proper, a prospective juror must express a "total inability" to vote for the death penalty." In Boulden the Court found that eleven
veniremen had been improperly excused when they indicated on voir dire
that they had a "fixed position against capital punishment."3 3 The majority set the standard by declaring that even a venireman who asserts a
"fixed position against" the death penalty might still be able to "fairly
consider" its imposition in a particular case. 4 The seeming infeasibility of
applying this standard in practice became apparent: any competent defense attorney with an active imagination could, if allowed, illustrate a
crime so heinous that even the most staunch opponent of capital punishment would agree to consider the death penalty as punishment. 5 Once that
31. Id. at 482.
32. Id. at 482 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 516 (1968)).
33. An excerpt of the voir dire was quoted in a footnote to the opinion and illustrates
the manner in which the examination was conducted, and the respective exchanges between
the court, the prosecution, and the defense as to selected veniremen.
[As to Venireman Nelson:]
THE COURT: Do you have a fixed opinion against capital or penitentiary
punishment?
MR. NELSON: Capital punishment.
THE COURT: You think you would never be willing to inflict the death penalty in
any type case?
MR. NELSON: Yes, sir.
MR. HUNDLEY: We challenge.
THE COURT: Defendant?
MR. CHENAULT: No questions.
[As to Venireman Collier:]
THE COURT: What is your position on capital or penitentiary punishment?
MR. COLLIER: I don't believe in capital punishment.
THE COURT: State?
MR. HUNDLEY: Challenge.
THE COURT: Any questions, Mr. Chenault?
MR. CHENAULT: No questions.
THE COURT: You are excused ....
[As to Venireman Seibert:]
THE COURT: Do you have a fixed opinion against capital punishment?
MR. SEIBERT: Yes, sir.
MR. HUNDLEY: We challenge.
THE COURT: Defendant?
MR. CHENAULT: No questions.
THE COURT: Stand aside. You are excused.
Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482-83 & nn. 6 & 7 (1969).
34. Id. at 483-84. Although the voir dire examination conducted in Boulden appeared to
be in violation of Witherspoon, the Court refused to determine the question and remanded
the case for further examination of the record since the issue was first raised on appeal to
the Supreme Court. Id. at 484.
35. See State v. Forcella, 245 A.2d 181, 196 (N.J. 1968) (prospective female juror excused
who stated ability to vote for death penalty for rape but not for murder); Smith v. State, 437
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concession is extracted from the prospective juror, he can no longer be
excused for cause according to Boulden.38 Moreover, in Maxwell v.
Bishop,3" the Court determined that such equivocal answers as "I think,"
"I'm afraid," and "I don't believe" did not satisfy the "unmistakably
clear" standard of Witherspoon.3"
The deficiencies of the Witherspoon doctrine became obvious as the
Court in Boulden and Maxwell began to review specific questions and
answers asked on voir dire." The general principles announced in these
opinions did not provide the needed guidance for lower courts to determine
whether an answer was acceptable under Witherspoon. Jury selection procedures in capital cases for a time provided a virtually automatic ground
of appeal. The problem involved an enigma: The lower courts were in need
of criteria in this area; in order to provide guidance, the Supreme Court
would have to furnish a standard of acceptable answers under
Witherspoon; if the Court were to provide such standards, its responsibilities could conceivably continue indefinitely.
TEXAS: THE RELUCTANT OFFSPRING

Pre-Furman Oscillation
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the prosecution
may challenge for cause any venireman who voices conscientious scruples
against capital punishment.'" This statute closely resembles the Illinois
statute which was held to have "stacked the deck" against the defendant
in Witherspoon." This similarity has provided fertile ground of appeal for
S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (prospective juror excused who indicated possibility
of voting for death penalty in murder but not in case at bar).
36. Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482 (1968).
37. 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (per curiam).
38. Id. at 264-66. After the following colloquy a juror was successfully challenged:
Q. If you were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt at the end of this trial that the
defendant was guilty and that his actions had been so shocking that they would merit
the death penalty do you have any scruples about capital punishment that might
prevent you from returning such a verdict?
A. I think I do.
Id. at 264.
39. See Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 263-64 (1970) (per curiam); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1969).
40. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 35.16(b)(1) (1966). This article provides: "A challenge for cause may be made by the State for any of the following reasons: 1. That the juror
has conscientious scruples in regard to the infliction of the punishment of death for crime, in
a capital case, where the state is seeking the death penalty .... "
41. Compare ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959) (repealed 1964) with TEX. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. ANN. art. 35.16(b)(1) (1966). The Illinois statute involved in Witherspoon provided: "In
trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined,
state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to
the same." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959) (repealed 1964).
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defendants convicted of capital crimes in Texas.42
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Witherspoon, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals was presented with an opportunity to determine
the validity of article 35.16(b)(1) in light of that decision. Noting that a
venireman's "conscientious scruples" against the death penalty had always been sufficient reason to challenge for cause, the court upheld the
statute. 3 The key distinction relied upon by the court to distinguish the
Texas statute from the Witherspoon test, was that article 35.16(b)(1), as
applied, did not disqualify a scrupled juror from sitting in a capital case,
it merely allowed the prosecution to challenge the venireman for cause.44
Although the court remanded this case for a new trial, the court's interpretation of the statute effectively ignored the policy and purposes for the rule
in Witherspoon and maintained the status quo in Texas jury selection
procedure.45
Because the Supreme Court had failed to distinguish between a disqualification and a challenge for cause when veniremen are excluded on the
basis of conscientious scruples, the states were left an avenue for circumvention of the Witherspoon mandate. The critical element in the
Witherspoon test is that the final jury composition must be one which
would ensure an impartial consideration of whether the death sentence
should be imposed on a defendant." Thus, under the Witherspoon test, it
is necessary to determine the degree of objection the venireman holds in
regard to the imposition of the death penalty before he or she may be
excluded. The question the Texas court failed to address was whether
42. In 1971 alone, the Supreme Court overturned at least five death sentences that had
been affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Whan v. Texas, 403 U.S. 946
(1971), rev'g, 438 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Crain v. Beto, 403 U.S. 947 (1971),
rev'g, Crain v. State, 394 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Harris v. Texas, 403 U.S. 947
(1971), rev'g, 457 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Quintana v. Texas, 403 U.S. 947 (1971),
rev'g, 441 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Turner v. Texas, 403 U.S. 947 (1971), rev'g,
462 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). For a review of other jurisdictions whose death penalty
statutes suffer from the same constitutional deficiencies, see Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374,
383 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
43. Ellison v. State, 432 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). The death sentence in
Ellison had been affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 1967, and was later
vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court in light of Witherspoon. Ellison v. Texas, 392
U.S. 649 (1968), vacating and remanding, 419 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). The
hearing on remand was the first opportunity for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to
determine the validity of article 35.16(b)(1) under the Witherspoon principle. See Ellison v.
State, 432 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
44. Ellison v. State, 432 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (challenge predicated
on "bias and prejudice").
45. Id. at 956. The court merely referred to its original opinion affirming the conviction
before the United States Supreme Court vacated the death sentence in Furman.
46. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518-19 (1968).
47. See id. at 520. The Court expressed the general policy considerations of its decision:
[Wihen it swept from the jury all who expressed conscientious or religious scruples
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article 35.16(b)(1) allowed veniremen with only general objections to the
death penalty to be excluded.
In Spencer v. Beto4" the Fifth Circuit overturned a Texas death sentence
because the Witherspoon principle had been violated. Although the appellate court discussed the Texas statute, it did not hold it unconstitutional;
instead, the court emphasized the importance of the two-prong test of
Witherspoon and the degree of opposition necessary before a juror may be
excluded. 9 Conceding that the jurors excused in Spencer may have had
"very strong scruples" against the death penalty, the court of appeals held
that this response did not satisfy the "automatic" vote against capital
punishment necessary to justify their exclusion under Witherspoon.0
Shortly after the Fifth Circuit decision in Spencer, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals again justified article 35.16(b)(1) by focusing on
52
"traditional Texas practice." '51 The court observed in Pittman v. State
that it was "traditional Texas practice" to determine whether a prospective juror "could never vote for" capital punishment before he or she could
be challenged.5" By so doing, the court disregarded the language of the
statute and accentuated the role of both counsel during the jury selection
process. The court reasoned that neither the prosecution nor the defense
would be willing to accept a juror less than fully qualified under
Witherspoon, because to do so would provide opposing counsel a
"windfall." 54 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals believed this factor
afforded capital defendants the necessary Witherspoon safeguards and
thereby circumvented any consideration of the statute. 55 The court refused
to hold that article 35.16(b)(1) fell short of the Witherspoon requirements.
Instead, the court cast the responsibility for compliance with Witherspoon
on the trial court and counsel, yet offered no guidance for meeting those
56
responsibilities.
The inconsistencies in the position taken by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals are illustrated by the procedure employed in upholding the death
sentence in Pittman. The Texas court distinguished that case from
against capital punishment and all who opposed it in principle, the State crossed the
line of neutrality. In its quest for a jury capable of imposing the death penalty, the
State produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.
Id. at 520-21.
48. 398 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1968).
49. See id. at 501.
50. Id. at 402. The same standard was applied in at least two other cases. See Irving v.
Breazeale, 400 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1968); Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 804-05 (5th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1105 (1969).
51. See Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
52. 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
53. Id.. at 356-57.
54. Id. at 356.
55. See id. at 356-57.
56. See id. at 356.
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Witherspoon, asserting that there was no effort in Pittman to sweep all
scrupled veniremen from the jury panel without determining whether they
would be "compelled" to vote against the death penalty." While noting
that 42 of 126 prospective jurors were excused because of their conscientious scruples, the court felt that all but possibly three excusals fell within
the standard of Witherspoon." In upholding these exclusions, the court
relied on the recognized discretion of the trial judge in excusing jurors when
their answers are equivocal or qualified." This discretion, however, was
never mentioned as a consideration when the Supreme Court announced
its two-prong test in Witherspoon.0 It is evident that the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals viewed the impact of Witherspoon on "Texas practice"
as minimal.6
57. Id. at 356.
58. Id. at 356-57. The court did not discuss voir dire examination of these jurors in its
opinion, except to note that one additional juror was justifiably excluded because he would
not vote for the death penalty in the case of a teenaged defendant. Id. at 356 n.4. Another of
the jurors, whom the court found constitutionally within the Witherspoon rule was examined
as follows:
Q. [D]o you feel that you could vote for the death penalty or do you feel that you
would have conscientious scruples against the giving of the death penalty . .. ?
A. I don't believe in the death penalty.
Q. You don't believe in the death penalty?
A. I don't think so. (Emphasis added).
[After the prosecution had challenged this juror for cause, she was questioned by
counsel for defendant:]
Q. Could you imagine of any case so heinous . . . that you could vote for the death
penalty if you were taken as a juror?
A. Well, I don't believe in it but I might be convinced on it ....
Q. If the evidence were strong enough to satisfy you . . . could you vote for the death
penalty?
A. Well, I really, I probably would be, I probably would after not believing in it.
23 Sw. L.J. 405, 408 n.19 (1969) (quoting Brief for Amicus Curiae at Appendix, Pittman v.
State, 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)). It appears that this prospective juror would
not have "automatically" voted against the death penalty in all cases and was, therefore,
excused in violation of Witherspoon.
59. Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 357 (1968).
60. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The tone of Witherspoon's trial was
set by the trial judge who, exercising his discretion, stated his desire to "get these conscientious objectors out of the way, without wasting any time on them." Id. at 514.
61. Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). The court stated that
where there is doubt whether a prospective juror held conscientious scruples against the death
penalty, the prosecution's challenge for cause would be upheld on appeal. In this case the
court emphasized the fact that defense counsel made no further request to interrogate excluded veniremen and refused to accept two additional peremptory challenges offered by the
trial judge, as mitigating the possible improper exclusion of veniremen. Id. at 357. The court
placed the burden on defense counsel to protect his client's constitutional rights. See id. at
357. The court did recommend, however, that in the future a record be kept of the voir dire
examination in order to preserve for appellate review the jury selection proceedings. Id. at
357-58. See also Wilhelm v. State, 426 S.W.2d 850, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (no error
presented for review where voir dire examination not brought forward in record).
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The Texas court made "unmistakably clear" that it was going to apply
state, not federal, standards in determining whether jury selection proceedings in capital cases met the dictates of justice." When Pittman
moved for rehearing, his attorney contended that the Witherspoon standard must be met in the examination of every prospective juror. 3 The
court of criminal appeals rejected this as a "drastic standard," 4 and asserted that Witherspoon need only be strictly complied with when a juror
whom the defendant has seriously tried to qualify has been excused. 2 By
so doing, the court inverted the duty of the prosecution to disqualify a
venireman under Witherspoon and placed the duty to qualify a prospective
juror squarely on the defepdant."1 This position is totally inconsistent with
the mandate of Witherspoon.7
In Marion v. Beto 5 the Fifth Circuit noted a sharp contrast between the
language of Witherspoon and that of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
6
in Pittman.
" Taking into consideration the degree of discretion a jury is
granted in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty, together
with the irrevocable and grave nature of the punishment, the court decided
that the improper exclusion of even one juror would prejudice the defendant's rights.70 The circuit court emphasized that since a properly empaneled jury could still vote to impose the death penalty, it would only be
62. See Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
63. Id. at 361.
64. Id. at 361.
65. Id. at 362. See also Grider v. State, 468 S.W.2d 393, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)
(consideration of proceeding's atmosphere required).
66. See Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
67. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968). In regard to state statutes
the Witherspoon majority held: "If the voir dire testimony in a given case indicates that
veniremen were excluded on any broader basis. . . the death sentence cannot be carried out
even if applicable . . . case law in the relevant jurisdictionwould appear to support only a
narrower ground of exclusion." Id. at 522 n.21 (emphasis added). See Scott v. State, 434
S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 925 (1969). In affirming the
conviction and death sentence of the defendant, the court recognized that one or more veniremen "may have been" excused in violation of Witherspoon. The court held, however, that
the exclusion of those jurors did not "stack the deck" against the defendant, as defense
counsel had not examined the jurors further to determine whether they qualified. The court
assumed that defense counsel did not want the jurors, and therefore the Witherspoon test had
been satisfied. Id. at 683. See also Harris v. State, 457 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970),
rev'd, 403 U.S. 947 (1971). The Texas court held in Harris that even though certain jurors
may have been improperly excused, the prosecution had not crossed the "line of neutrality."
The court looked to the entire atmosphere of the proceedings rather than simply the voir dire
examination of the prospective jurors in order to determine whether there was a violation of
Witherspoon. Id. at 909 & n.3.
68. 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
69. Id. at 31-32.
70. Id. at 32. The court stated: "Where ...
unanimity of decision is required to impose
the death sentence, the stark reality is that one improperly excluded juror may mean the
difference between life and death for a defendant." Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
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equitable to protect the defendant's rights from the "vast difference in
treatment" which could result if even a single venireman were improperly
excluded. 7 Thus, the position taken by the Fifth Circuit was in opposition
to the holdings of the Texas court."
Subsequent to the Fifth Circuit decision in Marion, the Supreme Court
reversed a number of Texas death sentences on Witherspoon grounds in
memorandum opinions." Tezeno v. State74 presented the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals with an opportunity to bring its position into conformity
with the dictates of the Supreme Court. The Texas court, however, maintained the view that Witherspoon was not to be given a "hypertechnical"
application" and criticized the Supreme Court for failing to provide the
necessary guidance in this area. The Texas court upheld the death sentence in Tezeno despite the ambiguous responses of two prospective jurors
on voir dire examination.7 6 The court reasoned that these answers were
"more unequivocal" than those in the reversals.77 The Supreme Court
never had the opportunity to examine this line of reasoning, however, as
the sentence was commuted following the Court's declaration that the
death penalty, as then imposed, was unconstitutional."
There are a number of policy considerations for the staunch position of
the Texas courts in their unwillingness to reverse convictions under
71. Id. at 32.
72. Cf. Huffman v. State, 450 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (where prosecution exercised only 7 of its 15 peremptory challenges, exclusion of jurors in violation of

Witherspoon held not reversible error); Scott v.'State, 434 S.W.2d 678, 683 (Tex. Crim. App.
1968) (where prosecution had not exhausted its peremptory challenges, held not reversible

error), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 925 (1969); Whan v. State, 438 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1969) (where prosecution exercised only 1 of 15 peremptory challenges, held not reversible error), rev'd, 403 U.S. 946 (1971).
73. Cases cited note 46 supra. Judge Onion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal voiced
the frustration of the court at the number of reversals the criminal justice system had suffered
due to Witherspoon. He emphasized that the memorandum decision of the Supreme Court
had failed to furnish guidelines that the state courts could follow in selecting juries in capital
cases. In view of the reversals, however,. he reconsidered the majority holding in Tezeno and
concluded that the jurors had been, in fact, improperly excluded. Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d
374, 385-86. (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (dissenting to opinion following commutation of sent-

ence).
74. 484 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
75. Id. at 383. The court quoted Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970), contending
that Witherspoon must not be applied "with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a
19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality." Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d
374, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).

76. See Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 380-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (dissenting to
opinion following commutation of sentence).

77. Id. at 383-89. One prospective juror had contradicted himself during the voir dire
examination. Another, when asked whether she knew of any facts or circumstances that would
justify her voting to render a verdict of death, answered, "I don't believe I could." Id. at 381.
78. See id. at 385 (opinion following commutation of sentence). See also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972).
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Witherspoon. One influential factor may have been the heinous crimes for
which capital defendants were convicted." There is also a procedural complication deriving from the bifurcated trial system in Texas811 If a death
sentence is overturned by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals or the
Supreme Court, the only disposition that the court of criminal appeals is
authorized to make is to remand the entire case for a new trial2' These
factors provide an impetus for the Texas court to uphold the judgments if
at all possible. Such considerations seem insubstantial, however, when a
man's life hangs in the balance.
Post-Jurek Equivocation
The new Texas Penal Code became effective on January 1, 1974.2 The
Code includes a statutory scheme for the imposition of the death penalty,
designed to conform to the mandates enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Furman v. Georgia.3 The Court in Furman condemned capital punishment as then imposed because the degree of jury discretion allowed by the
prevailing state statutes led to an arbitrary and capricious infliction of that
penalty."' Four years later, however, the Supreme Court approved the
amended Texas death penalty procedure in Jurek v. Texas. 5 The Court
found that the Texas procedure eliminated the Furman objections to the
death penalty by narrowing the category of capital murder and providing
the sentencing jury with the guidance necessary to perform its task in a
rational and consistent manner26
79. The following examples are illustrative of the capital crimes that were before the
court on Witherspoon grounds. In Harris v. State, the defendant was charged with the murder
of his mother and her friend. Both women had their throats slit. 457 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1970), rev'd, 403 U.S. 947 (1971). Another defendant and a friend called a taxicab and
forced the driver to drive to a deserted road. They ordered him to disrobe, robbed and shot
him to death. Whan v. State, 438 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 946
(1971). The defendant in Scott v. State, 434 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 925 (1969), was convicted of raping his 20 year old victim five times. The victim
was also raped six times by co-principals in the defendant's presence.
80. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides for a separate trial for guilt and
punishment before the same jury. The judgment cannot be complete until the jury has
rendered a verdict on both guilt and punishment. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.07
(Supp. 1976-1977).
81. Ellison v. State, 432 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); see Sellars v. Estelle,
400 F. Supp. 854, 858 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Grider v. State, 468 S.W.2d 393, 400 (Tex. Crim. App.
1971); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.24 (Supp. 1976-1977). See also Stanley v. State,
490 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (dissenting opinion); Whan v. State, 485 S.W.2d
275, 277-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
82. See Tex. Laws 1973, ch. 399, § 4, at 995.
83. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
84. Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring).
85. U.S....,
, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2958, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, 941 (1976); see TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Supp. 1976-77).
86. Jurek v. Texas,

-

U.S .

...

96 S. Ct. 2950, 2958, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, 941

(1976).
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Concurrent with the restoration of the death penalty, came the revival
of the Witherspoon test. In an effort to adapt Texas jury selection procedures to Witherspoon and the new death penalty statutes, section 12.31(b)
was included in the penal code revision. 7 This section provides that all
jurors in capital cases be informed of the penalties that could be imposed
upon conviction. 8 The code further provides that a juror may be disqualified unless he states under oath that the imposition of the death penalty
will not affect his or her decision on any issue of fact.89 The tangible effect
of this statute is that it enabled the court of criminal appeals to avoid the
Witherspoon test altogether. 8
The first and the most baffling of the post-Jurek cases is Hovila v.
State."' Defense counsel filed a motion in limine to limit inquiry into the
prospective jurors' feelings about capital punishment, and the motion was
granted." Consequently, the trial judge conducted only a cursory examination of the venire panel, and a number of prospective jurors were excused
after expressing a general objection to the death penalty. 3 On appeal the
appellant complained that the standards of Witherspoon had been violated; the court of criminal appeals sustained this contention and reversed
the conviction. 4 This decision departed from the previous Texas position
which held defense counsel responsible for protecting the defendant's
rights under the Witherspoon doctrine. The motion filed by defense
counsel in this case was tantamount to a specific waiver of the defendant's Witherspoon rights, yet the court of criminal appeals allowed the
defendant's conviction to be reversed.
87. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (1974). See also Crump, Capital Murder: The
Issues in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 531, 541-46 (1977).
88. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (1974). The exact provision is:
(b) Prospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or death
is mandatory on conviction of a capital felony. A prospective juror shall be disqualified
from serving as a juror unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death
or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.
Id.
89. Id.
90. See Burns v. State, No. 50,576, slip op. at 6-7 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 1977); Shippy
v. State, No. 53,831, slip op. at 5 (Tex. Crim. App. April 27, 1977); Whitmore v. State, No.
52,325, slip op. at 5-6 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1976); Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664, 672
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
91. 532 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
92. Id. at 300 (Motion for Rehearing) (dissenting opinion) (defendant's unusual request
not mentioned in the majority opinion).
93. Id. at 295. Representative of the juror's responses were the following: "I can't-I don't
believe in the death penalty, I feel I'm disqualified"; "With a clear conscience I could not
make a decision of that magnitude"; "I'm afraid my conscience wouldn't let me give the
death sentence." Id. at 295.
94. Id. at 294-95.
95. See Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
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The most plausible explanation for the action of the court in this case is
that Hovila presented the opportunity for the court to determine whether
the Witherspoon test was still applicable in Texas in view of the oath
required by section 12.31(b). The majority held that the Witherspoon rule
remained unchanged, reasoning that the jurors' knowledge of the effect of
their answers could not help but influence their decision when responding
to the statutory questions which will determine whether the death penalty
will be assessed." This influence is not alleviated even though under this
new procedure the sentence is actually assessed by the trial judge.,' In
Smith v. State" the court went further and determined the section 12.31(b)
oath to be but one criterion in the qualification of each prospective juror."
In the wake of these decisions, the Texas court appeared to be willing to
follow the dictates of Witherspoon.
After the decision in Hovila, the court of criminal appeals began to relax
its standards in determining whether a prospective juror's answer met the
Witherspoon test.'00 In Boulware v. State'0' the court held that a failure to
object to the improper exclusion of a juror waives the right to raise that
issue on appeal.'0 The court, therefore, recanted the position it took in
Hovila and instead relied on recent Supreme Court decisions which held
that certain constitutional rights may be waived by a failure to assert those
rights.' 3 The Texas court distinguished the Fifth Circuit decision in
Marion v. Beto,'0" noting that Marion's original trial took place before the
96. Hovila v. State, 532 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); see TEx. CODE CRIM.

PROc. ANN. art. 37.071 (Supp. 1976-1977).
97. Id. at 294. See also TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (Supp. 1976-1977); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (1974).

98. 540 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
99. Id. at 698.
100. See Woodkins v. State, 542 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (veniremen
excluded without further examination after stating that death penalty would affect his deliberation); White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (responses of "I don't
think so," and "I am not sure" warranted exclusion); Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693, 698
n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (juror excused who responded "[dleath is something that I would
not be able to condemn anybody to.").
101. 542 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), noted in 55 TEx. L. REv. 129 (1977).
102. Id. at 682-83. This position might not stand in light of the later Supreme Court
-,
97 S. Ct. 399, 50 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1976) (per
decision in Davis v. Georgia, - U.S. -,
curiam), which held that if even one prospective juror was excluded improperly, the death
sentence could not be upheld. Id. at -, 97 S. Ct. at 400, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 341. See also Marion
v. Beto, 434 F.2d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). The mandate of
the Court may be such as would preclude this kind of error from being waived. See Shippy
v. State, No. 53,831, slip op. at 12-14 (Tex. Crim. App. April 27, 1977) (dissenting opinion).
103. Estelle v. Williams,

U.S.

-

-

,

_; 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1696-97, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126,

135 (1976) (defendant's failure to object to trial before a jury in prison garb); Francis v.
Henderson,

__

U.S

-

,

-,

96 S. Ct. 1708, 1711, 48 L. Ed. 2d 149, 154-55 (1976)

(defendant's failure to timely object to composition of grand jury that indicted him).
104. 434 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
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Witherspoon decision was rendered."'5 Under these circumstances, the
court reasoned, a defendant could not be required to assert a right that was
not then available."" In Boulware, however, the right was established and
the defendant failed to claim it, therefore, the court held he was precluded
from raising the matter on appeal.' 7
It seems that the court of criminal appeals has reverted to its pre-Jurek
position and again contravened the purpose of the Witherspoon rule. 1' The
court of criminal appeals acknowledged that the new procedure for the
imposition of the death penalty does not eliminate the effect of a juror's
opinion when answering the statutory questions required."' They, however, have avoided the mandate of Witherspoon, which requires the court
to ascertain the degree of opposition a juror holds against the death penalty, by improperly placing that burden on the defendant."" The Texas
court disregards the effect of its position on Texas capital defendants who,
as a result, could be condemned to trial by a death prone jury."
Section 12.31(b): An "Exclusive" Oath
A complete departure from the Witherspoon standard resulted when the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided Moore v. State." In reconsidering the role of the oath required by section 12.31(b), the court ruled that
Witherspoon considerations were unnecessary when a prospective juror
expressed a "strong opposition" to capital punishment which rendered him
unable to take the oath."' The court did not elaborate in its reasoning in
arriving at the decision, but stated simply that section 12.31(b) eliminated
any obligation to discuss the Witherspoon issue."' The oath, which at first
reading may seem consistent, actually provides a broader basis for exclusion than the Witherspoon test by disqualifying any prospective juror
whose deliberation on any issue of fact would be affected in any way by
105. Boulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
106. Id. at 681.
107. Id. at 681-83.
108. Compare Boulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) with
Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
109. Hovila v. State, 532 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
110. See Boulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677, 681-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Pittman v.
State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
111. Compare Boulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677, 681-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) and
Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) with Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 520-21 (1968) and Marion v. Beto, 434 F.2d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1970).
112. 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
113. Id. at 672.
114. Id. at 672. The court went further in Whitmore v State, No. 52,325, slip op. at 6
(Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1976) and stated that as long as a juror is disqualified under section
12.31(b), "it is of no consequence" that the juror qualifies under Witherspoon. Id. slip op. at
6. See also Woodkins v. State, 542 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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the imposition of the death penalty. 5 This standard is reminiscent of that
imposed by the Illinois statute struck down in Witherspoon."' The new
Texas position was expanded inWhitmore v. State,"' where it was conceded that the juror in question qualified under Witherspoon."8 The court
held that as long as the venireman was disqualified under section 12.31(b),
it was of no consequence that the same juror qualified under
Witherspoon."' These decisions are in direct conflict, not only with the
mandate of Witherspoon, but also with the more recent Supreme Court
decision of Davis v. Georgia.'
In Davis the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed a death sentence in spite
of the fact that one prospective juror had been excused in violation of
Witherspoon.'' The Georgia court reasoned that the defendant had not
been denied a jury representing a cross-section of the community, in view
of the fact that other jurors who had some objections to the death penalty
had not been excluded.' 2 The United States Supreme Court ruled that this
decision could not stand under the Witherspoon test,2 which holds that a
prospective juror can only be excluded when he will not, under any circumstances, vote to inflict the death penalty.' According to Davis, a death
sentence could not stand if even one venireman were excluded in violation
of this standard.'2 The Court's decision in Davis recognized, in effect, the
Fifth Circuit's position that because of the severity of the death penalty
and the role a juror's attitude plays in imposing that penalty, the improper
exclusion of even one prospective juror could mean the difference between
115. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (1974). Compare Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968) with Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
and Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) and Hovila v. State, 532
S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
116. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 523 (1968). The Witherspoon rule only allows
the exclusion of those veniremen who are "irrevocably committed" to vote against the death
penalty, regardless of the evidence. Id. at 522 n.21. The Illinois statute allowed any veniremen
who held conscientious scruples against capital punishment to be excluded. ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, § 743 (1959) (repealed 1964). Section 12.31(b) disqualifies any prospective juror who
cannot take an oath stating that the possible imposition of the death penalty "will not affect
his deliberations on any issue of fact." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (1974).
117. No. 52,325 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1976).
118. Id. slip op. at 6.
119. Id. slip op. at 6.
120.
- U.S. - ... 97 S. Ct. 399, 400, 50 L. Ed. 2d 339, 341 (1976).
121. Davis v. State, 225 S.E.2d 241, 244-45 (Ga.), rev'd, U.S ....

97 S. Ct.

399, 400, 50 L. Ed. 2d 339, 341 (1976).
122. Davis v. State, 225 S.E.2d 241, 244 (Ga.), rev'd, -

U.S.

-.

97 S.Ct. 399,

400, 50 L. Ed. 2d 339, 341 (1976).
123. Davis v. Georgia,

-

U.S ....

97 S. Ct. 399, 400, 50 L. Ed. 2d 339, 341

(1976).
124. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
125. Davis v. Georgia, U.S....,
97 S.Ct. 399, 400, 50 L. Ed. 2d 339, 341
(1976); see Marion v. Beto, 434 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
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life and death for a capital defendant.'
Since the Witherspoon decision was rendered, the Texas court has experienced much difficulty in applying the standards promulgated in that
case. 1 Even after the Supreme Court decision in Davis, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals adhered to its previous interpretation of section
12.31(b). 28 Section 12.31(b) presented the court with an opportunity to
avoid Witherspoon's application and provided justification for the decision
to follow its own interpretation of what constitutes an equitable jury selection process. This intransigence in addressing the policy of Witherspoon
has been evidenced by the court's summary dismissal of the constitutional
contention whenever it has been asserted.'29
This conflict has not been overlooked completely, however. The constitutionality of section 12.31(b) was questioned by the strong dissent in
Shippy v. State. I There it was indicated that the affectation which would
disqualify a venireman under section 12.31(b) may not meet the
Witherspoon requirement of an unambiguous and irrevocable commitment
to vote against the death penalty.' The Court in Witherspoon specifically
condemned any state law that supports a "broader basis . . . for exclu-

sion."32 Although not clear from the face of the statute, the prevailing
interpretation by the court of criminal appeals would seem to carry section
33
12.31(b) onto this "broader basis.'

The unsettled state of the law regarding jury selection procedure in
Texas was illustrated in two distinct cases'.' The defendant in Burns v.
126. Davis v. Georgia, - U.S. -, -,
97 S. Ct. 399, 400, 50 L. Ed. 2d 339, 341
(1976); see Marion v. Beto, 434 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
127. See Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 383-84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (listing a
number of Texas convictions reversed on Witherspoon grounds).
128. Burns v. State, No. 50,576, slip op. at 6-7 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 1977); Shippy
v. State, No. 53,831, slip op. at 5 (Tex. Crim. App. April 27, 1977); Whitmore v. State, No.
52,325, slip op. at 5-6 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1976).
129. See Burns v. State, No. 50,576, slip op. at 6-7 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 1977);
Shippy v. State, No. 53,831, slip op. at 5 (Tex. Crim. App. April 27, 1977); Whitmore v.
State, No. 52,325, slip op. at 5-6 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 1976); Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d
664, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
130. No. 53,831 (Tex. Crim. App. April 27, 1977) (dissenting opinion).
131. Id. slip op. at 11 (dissenting opinion). Judge Truman Roberts observed:
It is readily apparent that a person who generally objects to the death penalty because
of conscientious and religious scruples against its infliction will have his determination
of fact affected by such belief. But if such "affectation" does not amount to an unambiguous and irrevocable commitment to vote against the death penalty in all cases, such
individual cannot be constitutionally challenged for cause under Witherspoon.
Id. slip op. at 11.
132. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
133. See Shippy v. State, No. 53,831, slip op. at 11-12 (Tex. Crim. App. April 27, 1977)
(dissenting opinion); Burns v. State, No. 50,576, slip op. at 1 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 1977)
(dissenting opinion).
134. Brock v. State, No. 53,108 (Tex. Crim. App. June 14, 1977); Burns v. State, No.
50,576 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 1977).
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State 5 made a sweeping attack on virtually every aspect of jury selection
under Witherspoon, and was denied relief on each issue. 3 ' The court of
criminal appeals summarily dismissed the allegation of conflict with
Witherspoon by reaffirming its previous position.'37 The court found no
reversible error in the trial court's refusal to grant defense counsel's request
to further examine two prospective jurors because, among other reasons,
the prosecution had exercised only thirteen of its fifteen peremptory challenges.'38 Defense counsel made the same request regarding a third venireman, whereupon the court and the prosecution asked the venireman several more questions. After this colloquy the prospective juror was successfully challenged for cause and defense counsel objected. 3 The court of
criminal appeals found that despite these actions on the part of defense
counsel, he did not sufficiently attempt to qualify these jurors so that their
exclusion would constitute reversible error on Witherspoon grounds." ' The
court also found such responses as "[t]hat is what I believe," and "[v]ery
likely," sufficient affectation to disqualify the veniremen under section
12.31(b)."'
The court in Burns reverted to pre-Furmanstandards for excusing jurors, again placing the burden on the defendant to strongly assert those
rights or risk losing them on appeal."' The court ruled that the responses
of the veniremen in this case disqualified them under section 12.31(b),
thus, application of the Witherspoon test became altogether unnecessary.4 3 Responses similar to these have been held by the Supreme Court
to specifically violate the Witherspoon standard."'
The inconsistencies in the Texas position are most clearly reflected by
the court's decision in Brock v. State."' In that case the jurors had been
excused in accordance with the Witherspoon test but had not been disqualified under section 12.31(b)." 6 The court of criminal appeals held that a
venireman may be disqualified under either Witherspoon or section
135. No. 50,576 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 1977).
136. Id. slip op. at 4-14.

137. Id. slip op. at 6-7.
138. Id. slip op. at 10.
139. Id. slip op. at 9-10.

140. Id. slip op. at 10; see Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 361-62 (Tex. Crim. App.
1968).
141. Id. Bums v. State, No. 50,576, slip op. at 6-9 (Tex. Crim. App..May 3, 1977).
142. Burns v. State, No. 50,576, slip op. at 13 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 1977); see Pitt-

man v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
143. Bums v. State, No. 50,576, slip op. at 13 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 1977); see Moore
v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
144. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 264-65 (1970) (per curiam); Boulden v. Holman,
394 U.S. 478, 482-83 & nn.6 & 7 (1969).
145. No. 53,108 (Tex. Crim. App. June 14, 1977).

146. Id. slip op. at 4-6.
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12.31(b) or both.47 The court further held that it did not matter which test
the venireman was interrogated under first.'
There are two conflicting inferences which may be drawn from the Brock
case. First, it may be reasonable to conclude that the Witherspoon standard and the section 12.31(b) oath are not the same test. If these tests were
the same, the court would not be compelled to have included the words
"or both" in its opinion." ' Second, the fact that it does not matter which
test a prospective juror is disqualified under lends support to the belief
that both tests are the same, since the mandates of the Supreme Court
must be followed by state courts. 50 It seems, therefore, that the present
position of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is unsettled and the test
to be used in jury selection is left totally to the discretion of the trial judge
and the prosecutor. 5' The fact that one test may provide a broader basis
for exclusion than the other has not been considered by the court.
CONCLUSION

An impartial jury is constitutionally guaranteed to every defendant by
the sixth amendment.'52 The purpose of Witherspoon v. Illinois'53 is to
preserve that impartiality in capital cases.' 5' Although capital punishment, as presently imposed in Texas, is compatible with the constitutional
prohibitions of the eighth amendment, 5 the present procedure does not
eliminate the influence of a juror's attitude toward that penalty when
answering the statutory questions that determine whether it will be inflicted. 5 ' Logically, it would seem that the Witherspoon test should continue to apply to jury selection proceedings in Texas.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals encountered a dilemma when
applying the Witherspoon test according to the standards of the United
States Supreme Court. 7 Partial responsibility for this dilemma lies in a
failure by the Court to provide precise guidelines for the application of the
standard; instead Witherspoon and subsequent cases can be interpreted as
a warning to the states to amend their jury selection proceedings.5 8 Section
147. Id. slip op. at 6.
148. Id. slip op. at 6.
149. See id. slip op. at 6.
150. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2; see Brock v. State, No. 53,108, slip op. at 6 (Tex. Crim.
App. June 14, 1977).
151. See Brock v. State, No. 53,108, slip op. at 6 (Tex. Crim. App. June 14, 1977).
152. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

153.
154.
155.
(1976).
156.
157.
158.

391 U.S. 510 (1968).
Id. at 518.
Jurek v. Texas, - U.S.

-,

,

96 S. Ct. 2950, 2958, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, 941

Hovila v. State, 532 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
See Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 383-84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 539 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
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12.31(b) of the Texas Penal Code is a provision for the qualification of
jurors in capital cases.' The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however,
has interpreted this section to exclude application of the Witherspoon
test.1 0 While the constitutionality of this provision has yet to be discussed
by the United States Supreme Court, it appears to be in direct conflict
with prior rulings of the Court.' The judicial interpretation of section
12.31(b) not only inverts the two-prong test, but ignores the intent and
purpose of the Witherspoon rule by placing the burden on the defense to
qualify prospective veniremen. Juries selected pursuant to this section
may well be "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to death," and if so,
it will be the Texas courts that have "stacked the deck" against the defendant.
159. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (1974).
160. Burns v. State, No. 50,576, slip op. at 6-7 (Tex. Crim. App. May 3, 1977); Shippy
v. State, No. 53,831, slip op. at 5 (Tex. Crim. App. April 27, 1977); Whitmore v. State, No.
52,325, slip op. at 5-6 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1976); Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664, 672
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
161. See Davis v. Georgia, U.S ....
97 S. Ct. 399, 400, 50 L. Ed. 2d 339,
341 (1976).
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